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PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY LESSONS AT 
THE INTERSECTION OF THE INTERNET OF 
THINGS AND POLICE BODY-WORN 
CAMERAS* 
PETER SWIRE** & JESSE WOO*** 
Prepared for the North Carolina Law Review symposium on 
police body-worn cameras (“BWCs”), this Article shows that 
BWCs can be conceptualized as an example of the Internet of 
Things (“IoT”). By combining the previously separate literatures 
on BWCs and IoT, this Article shows how insights from each 
literature apply to the other. 
Part I adopts the IoT definition of (1) a sensor connected to the 
Internet that (2) stores and/or processes data remotely, typically 
in the cloud. Applied to BWCs, the camera is a sensor, and the 
video footage and related data are stored outside of the original 
camera, often in the cloud. 
Building on this equivalence of BWCs and IoT, Part II examines 
lessons from the substantial IoT literature for BWC privacy and 
cybersecurity. Part II systematically examines leading industry 
standards and Federal Trade Commission guidance that could be 
used to develop applicable criteria for good practice for BWCs. 
Analysis of this literature suggests three themes for 
operationalizing these best practices. First, police departments 
can and should learn from the IoT literature to improve privacy 
and cybersecurity for BWCs. Second, police departments should 
use their bargaining power to demand security and privacy best 
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practices from their vendors. Third, where departments lack the 
in-house expertise to handle BWC security and privacy they 
should seek it from outside institutions or consultants, including 
from outside experts in IoT security and privacy. 
Part III examines two areas where study of BWCs might offer 
lessons for the broader domain of IoT. First, to protect police 
officer privacy during breaks and for other reasons, BWCs are 
not always on. By contrast, IoT best practices to date have not 
emphasized the implications of toggling the sensor on and off. 
Second, an important debate for BWCs is how to promote 
transparency—to provide accountability while protecting 
individual privacy. In this respect, BWCs are an application of 
technology where public disclosure of the entire data feed is a 
higher priority than for most other IoT applications to date. 
Studying this debate can inform other IoT debates about when to 
open full data feeds to the public, consistent with privacy and 
cybersecurity concerns. 
Privacy and cybersecurity risks will continue to evolve for both 
IoT generally and BWCs more specifically. Recognizing the 
overlap of these two usually distinct discourses can offer 
assistance to those in both realms as they face the new risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines privacy and cybersecurity issues for the 
topic of this symposium, police body-worn cameras (“BWCs”). BWCs 
already generate, and will increasingly generate, a great amount of 
video footage and related content. In our era of increasingly effective 
facial recognition, this video footage generates a vast amount of 
personally identifiable information, with consequent privacy issues. 
Over time, the volume of video footage will increase enormously, 
creating challenging cybersecurity issues for the data that is stored, 
often in the cloud. Cities and police departments will face substantial 
challenges in managing these privacy and cybersecurity issues. 
To develop good privacy and cybersecurity practices for BWCs, 
this Article proposes drawing on the already substantial experience 
with the Internet of Things (“IoT”). Definitions of IoT abound,1 but 
key aspects of the technology are (1) a sensor connected to the 
Internet that (2) stores and/or processes data remotely, typically in 
the cloud.2 Applied to BWCs, the camera is a sensor, and the video 
footage and related data are stored outside of the original camera, 
often in the cloud. Part I discusses the definition of IoT and describes 
how the technical capabilities and uses of BWCs fit this definition. 
Regulators, industry standards groups, and other experts have 
already developed documents that set forth best practices for privacy 
and cybersecurity in the IoT. In Part II, this Article examines three 
sets of best practices, which we believe will assist large and small 
police departments in recognizing and responding to privacy and 
cybersecurity risks: 
 
 1. See Harald Bauer, Mark Patel & Jan Veira, The Internet of Things: Sizing up the 
Opportunity, MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-
tech/our-insights/the-internet-of-things-sizing-up-the-opportunity [https://perma.cc/A9LT-
CU9K]; Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things (IoT)?, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 
2016, 2:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-the-internet-of-things-definition-
2016-8 [https://perma.cc/782H-82EN]. 
 2. See Sona R. Makker, Overcoming “Foggy” Notions of Privacy: How Data 
Minimization Will Enable Privacy in the Internet of Things, 85 UMKC L. REV. 895, 897 
(2017). When we say data is stored “in the cloud,” we mean it is stored on a remote server 
via an internet connection. These servers are part of the infrastructure of “cloud 
computing,” which is defined as “the delivery of on-demand computing resources—
everything from applications to data centers—over the internet on a pay-for-use basis.” 
What is Cloud Computing?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/what-is-cloud-
computing [https://perma.cc/SR2J-WU9S]. 
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(1) The Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group 
(“BITAG”) has promulgated cybersecurity and privacy 
recommendations for IoT.3 The BITAG report provides state-of-the-
art recommendations for IoT, especially for software. 
(2) Microsoft has issued its Internet of Things Security Best 
Practices.4 These complement the BITAG recommendations due to 
their focus on good physical security and hardware practices. 
(3) The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has written 
extensively on IoT for both privacy and cybersecurity issues. Along 
with the software and hardware recommendations of the BITAG and 
Microsoft, the FTC has numerous recommendations about 
appropriate administrative measures for the entire life-cycle of data 
from collection, through storage and use, to eventual destruction.5 
The expert IoT literature recommends security best practices, 
such as patchability and encryption, and privacy best practices, such 
as data minimization.6 This Article’s analysis of the literature suggests 
three themes for operationalizing these best practices. First, police 
departments can and should learn from the IoT literature to improve 
privacy and cybersecurity for BWCs. Second, police departments 
should use their bargaining power to demand security and privacy 
best practices from their vendors. Third, when departments lack the 
in-house expertise to handle BWC security and privacy, they should 
seek it from outside institutions or consultants, including from outside 
experts in IoT security and privacy. 
Part III examines two areas where study of BWCs might offer 
lessons for the broader domain of IoT. First, to protect police officer 
privacy during breaks and for other reasons, BWCs are not always 
on.7 By contrast, IoT sources such as the BITAG report and 
 
 3. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2016), https://www.bitag.org/documents
/BITAG_Report__Internet_of_Things_(IoT)_Security_and_Privacy_Recommendations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6AZM-V2XM]. 
 4. See Dominic Bets & Yuri Diogenes, Internet of Things Security Best Practices, 
MICROSOFT AZURE (Jan. 17, 2018), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/iot-suite/iot-
security-best-practices [https://perma.cc/6GQW-VTRY]. 
 5. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD, at iii (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports
/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-
privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3AQ-UTQD]. 
 6. Id. at 30–38. 
 7. JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED 
CAMERAS 3 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N5V7-S9TZ]. 
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Microsoft recommendations do not emphasize how to govern the 
possibility of toggling the sensor on and off.8 Analysis of BWCs thus 
may help supplement the existing IoT set of best practices. Second, an 
important debate for BWCs is how to promote transparency—to 
provide accountability while protecting individual privacy.9 In this 
respect, BWCs are an application of technology where public 
disclosure of the entire data feed is a higher priority than for most 
other IoT applications to date.10 Studying this debate can inform 
other IoT debates about when to open full data feeds to the public, 
consistent with privacy and cybersecurity concerns. 
I.  POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS ARE PART OF THE INTERNET OF 
THINGS 
This Part discusses the definition of IoT and describes how the 
technical capabilities and uses of police BWCs fit this definition. It 
will also review the BWC and IoT scholarship to show how the 
privacy and cybersecurity problems are similar for both technologies, 
yet the literature has not typically made this connection. 
A. The Functionality of BWCs Fits the Definition of IoT 
This Section provides a brief technical definition of IoT and 
shows how BWCs fit under that definition as an IoT device. IoT is a 
rapidly growing category of technology that many analysts believe 
will cause the next great wave of digitization and productivity 
enhancement.11 Examples of IoT devices range from the internet-
connected Amazon Echo speaker to connected traffic lights and 
smart utility meters.12 Many are excited for the potential of IoT 
 
 8. See BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at ii–iv; Bets 
& Diogenes, supra note 4. 
 9. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF 
BODY-WORN CAMERAS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES 2 (2015), 
https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1984/gd_bwc_201502_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK28-P24M]. 
 10. Cf. Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 
68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 410–12 (2016) (demonstrating that public debate over police 
accountability and America’s robust tradition of government transparency have spurred 
enthusiasm for disclosure of BWC footage). 
 11. See Meola, supra note 1. 
 12. See Matt Bellias, 3 Ways IoT Will Change Smart Meters for Utilities, IBM: 
INTERNET OF THINGS BLOG (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-
things/smart-meter-grid/ [https://perma.cc/VS56-7D3S]; Arjun Kharpal, Amazon’s Alexa 
Stole the Show at CES in a Bid to Become the Internet of Things Operating System, CNBC 
(Jan. 6, 2017 10:43 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/06/ces-2017-amazon-alexa-stole-
the-show-a-bid-to-become-the-iot-operating-system.html [https://perma.cc/9NXJ-7KNE]; 
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devices to monitor traffic congestion or the electrical grid.13 Often, the 
power of IoT comes from the high volume of sensors that can be 
deployed and connected within a system.14 Having many sensors 
allows for precision monitoring of complex systems, which can help 
with problems such as infrastructure maintenance, by identifying 
failure points without the need for human inspection.15 Other 
applications include smart homes devices (like the Nest thermometer) 
and internet-connected medical devices that allow for more granular 
control and personalization.16 Analysts project that by 2020, the IoT 
market will grow to over $470 billion in annual revenue, with over 
thirty billion devices installed.17 
Definitions of IoT abound,18 but key aspects of the technology 
are (1) a sensor connected to the internet that (2) stores and/or 
processes data remotely, typically in the cloud.19 The sensor measures 
some physical property of the world and may be aural, thermal, 
chemical, or some other type, but in many cases, it is visual.20 It is also 
 
SierraWireless, Smart Traffic Lights Help Ease the Burden of Rush Hour on City 
Infrastructure, IOT BLOG (Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.sierrawireless.com/iot-blog/iot-
blog/2017/07/smart_traffic_lights_help_ease_the_burden_of_rush_hour_on_city_infrastructure/ 
[https://perma.cc/XE7Z-3YVM].  
 13. See, e.g., Qinghai Ou et al., Application of Internet of Things in Smart Grid Power 
Transmission, 2012 THIRD FTRA INT’L CONF. ON MOBILE, UBIQUITOUS, & 
INTELLIGENT COMPUTING 96, 96, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp
=&arnumber=6305831 [https://perma.cc/9DDH-X4ND (staff-uploaded archive)]; Tanvi T. 
Thakur et al., Real Time Traffic Management Using Internet of Things, 2016 INT’L CONF. 
ON COMM. AND SIGNAL PROCESSING 1950, 1950, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp
.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7754512 [https://perma.cc/2PWG-844Z (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 14. See Makker, supra note 2, at 897. 
 15. See Ou et al., supra note 13, at 99. 
 16. Mathias Cousin, Tadashi Castillo-Hi & Glenn H. Snyder, Devices and Diseases: 
How the IoT is Transforming Medtech, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (Sep. 11, 2015), 
https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/focus/internet-of-things/iot-in-medical-devices-industry.html 
[https://perma.cc/5JUA-8RW3]; Andrew Meola, How IoT & Smart Home Automation 
Will Change the Way We Live, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2016, 4:44 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-smart-home-automation-2016-8 [https://perma.cc
/U7A8-7FGS]. 
 17. Louis Columbus, Roundup of Internet of Things Forecasts and Market Estimates, 
2016, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2016, 1:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2016
/11/27/roundup-of-internet-of-things-forecasts-and-market-estimates-2016/#50c87fef292d 
[https://perma.cc/L8L9-KYDN]. 
 18. Bauer et al., supra note 1; Meola, supra note 1.  
 19. Makker, supra note 2, at 897–98 (“The ubiquitous deployment of sensors form 
[sic] the backbone of what has been dubbed the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT).”) Another 
important aspect of some IoT applications is the ability of machines to communicate with 
one another, as with autonomous vehicles, but that definition is less pertinent to our 
discussion here.  
 20. Id. at 897. 
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embedded into physical objects (the “Thing” of Internet of Things) 
that in the past have not normally contained computational power or 
internet connectivity.21 Streetlights with internet-connected cameras 
are an increasingly common example of a visual IoT sensor.22 The 
sensor is a necessary component of IoT because it collects data, and 
that data collection opens up numerous useful applications.23 
A similarly important part of the IoT definition is the storage 
and processing of all that sensor data in the cloud. Cloud storage 
allows the people who run sensor networks to harness the massive 
amounts of data that IoT generates,24 and therefore enables the many 
benefits that can come from the combination of “Big Data” analysis 
and IoT devices.25 Cloud storage is also necessary because many IoT 
devices have limited storage and computational power on the device 
itself, so they require the cloud to function effectively.26 
Police BWCs fit both parts of this definition of IoT. A BWC is a 
camera and microphone typically worn near the officer’s front chest 
pocket or head-mounted on eyewear or a helmet.27 As a camera, it is 
a sensor by definition.28 In some cases, the audio-visual footage (the 
 
 21. In earlier work, Swire and co-authors proposed shifting the name to “Internet of 
Devices,” to highlight the fact that the devices are connected to the internet, while many 
“things” will remain unconnected (such as trees, to illustrate the point). RICHARD L. 
RUTLEDGE ET AL., GA. INST. OF TECH., DEFINING THE INTERNET OF DEVICES: 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014), https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream
/handle/1853/52020/plsc2014-IoD.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VSB-DQBR]. In this Article, the 
authors use the now-pervasive term “Internet of Things.” 
 22. Lily Hay Newman, Sheesh, Even Streetlights Are Getting Cameras and Internet 
Connections, SLATE (Oct. 2, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015
/10/02/ge_intelligent_lamp_posts_have_cameras_sensors_may_come_to_new_york_city.html 
[https://perma.cc/6AD7-XRW4]. 
 23. See Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things is Far Bigger Than Anyone Realizes, 
WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/ [https://perma.cc
/BAK9-M49H]. 
 24. Andrew Meola, The Roles of Cloud Computing and Fog Computing in the Internet 
of Things Revolution, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 20, 2016, 5:11 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-cloud-computing-2016-10 [https://perma.cc
/4DB6-LRKS].  
 25. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA 5 (2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may
_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/44RE-YRJG]. 
 26. Mike Chen, Why Cloud Computing is the Foundation of the Internet of Things, 
THORN TECHS. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.thorntech.com/2017/02/cloud-computing-
foundation-internet-things/ [https://perma.cc/DNV5-UGQ8]. 
 27. VIVIAN HUNG, STEVEN BABIN & JACQUELINE COBERLY, A PRIMER ON BODY-
WORN CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (2016), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-
Body-Worn-Cameras-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9D5-TN8R]. 
 28. Camera, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (3d ed. 1993). 
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data) may be stored locally on the camera and later uploaded to a 
central repository,29 but newer models upload or stream the data 
directly to the cloud.30 The data may stream directly to the cloud or 
through another piece of equipment such as the patrol car.31 Axon 
(formerly Taser), the largest BWC manufacturer, also offers data 
storage and processing services where the company can manage and 
analyze the footage for police departments.32 Like some other IoT 
manufacturers, Axon has evolved from a producer of hardware to a 
“data as a service” vendor by maintaining the cloud services for BWC 
data.33 In short, BWCs are examples of IoT devices—they have 
sensors and their data is generally stored and analyzed remotely, 
typically in the cloud. Use of BWCs is beginning to migrate from the 
policing context into other sectors, including healthcare and 
education.34 This expansion of BWC deployment also fits the 
conceptual model of BWCs as a type of general purpose IoT device 
rather than a pure policing tool. 
Having established that BWCs qualify as a type of IoT 
application, the next two Sections will demonstrate how the BWC and 
IoT literatures identify similar privacy and cybersecurity issues. 
Section I.B introduces the privacy and cybersecurity concerns 
presented in the BWC literature. In brief, these concerns are the 
 
 29. A model where data is recorded and later uploaded to the cloud from a central 
access point does not perfectly fit the definition of IoT, but the analogy that a distributed 
network of sensors funnel data back to a central point for storage and processing does fit. 
 30. See Matt Stroud, Taser Plans to Livestream Police Body Camera Footage to the 
Cloud by 2017, MOTHERBOARD (July 18, 2016, 3:06 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en
_us/article/4xa43g/taser-axon-police-body-camera-livestream [https://perma.cc/DZD5-YJFN]. 
Facial recognition is another emerging capability of BWCs that raises privacy concerns, 
but it is not yet widespread. Id. 
 31. See Matt Stroud, The Company That’s Livestreaming Police Body Camera 
Footage Right Now, MOTHERBOARD (July 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/9a3ddv/visual-labs-police-body-camera-livestream 
[https://perma.cc/P7DE-DPB3]. 
 32. Alex Pasternack, Why Taser Changed Its Name and Offered Every Cop A Body 
Camera, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40402050/taser-
axon-police-body-cameras-video-evidence-data [https://perma.cc/4UY5-W25W]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Our research to date has discovered these deployments in the United Kingdom. 
Sarah Knapton & Peter Walker, Doctors and Nurses Could be Issued with Body Cameras 
to Record Violent Patients, TELEGRAPH (May 5, 2017) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science
/2017/05/05/doctors-nurses-could-issued-on-body-cameras-record-violent-patients/ [https://perma.cc
/N515-QBYY]; Rozina Sabur, Teachers Wearing Body Cameras to Control Students’ 
Behavior in New Trial, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 8, 2017) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017
/02/08/teachers-wearing-body-cameras-control-students-behaviour-new/ [https://perma.cc
/Y86Y-93SV]. 
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challenge of ubiquitous sensors to privacy in public and private 
spaces; the difficulties with consent, raising trade-offs between 
privacy and transparency; and the security of digital evidence 
gathering tools. Section I.C will show how these issues relate to IoT. 
 
B. BWCs Raise Privacy and Cybersecurity Issues 
BWCs pose challenges for privacy in both public and private 
spaces. Private spaces are those where a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, such as inside a home or a bathroom.35 Public 
spaces are locations where individuals do not possess a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and from where they are generally not able to 
exclude others.36 The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Bureau of 
Justice Assistance writes that “[p]rivacy rights of the public are a 
primary concern” for BWCs.37 As BWCs are more widely deployed, 
“ever larger amounts of personal information (both video and audio) 
are being collected in increasingly diverse circumstances (both static 
and mobile) with the potential of being linked with yet other personal 
information (e.g., facial recognition, metadata).”38 Deploying BWCs 
on just fifty officers could generate the equivalent of 1.6 million 
feature-length movies in just three months.39 Similar widespread 
recording by new technology is beginning to challenge traditional 
legal limits of privacy in public spaces.40 
Moreover, BWCs can also infringe on the privacy of private 
spaces. The Police Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) warns that 
“while stationary surveillance cameras generally cover only public 
spaces, body-worn cameras give officers the ability to record inside 
private homes and to film sensitive situations that might emerge 
 
 35. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 36. See id. 
 37. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BODY-WORN 
CAMERA TOOLKIT FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc
/pdfs/bwc_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L4D-HBJ6].  
 38. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN. ET AL., supra note 9, at 2. 
 39. See St. John Barned-Smith, As Authorities Study Use of Body Cameras, Logistical 
Concerns Mount, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news
/houston-texas/houston/article/As-authorities-study-use-of-body-cameras-6201620.php 
[https://perma.cc/M2RZ-JGF6]. 
 40. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); 
Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 
(2017) (No. 16-402). 
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during calls for service.”41 Advocates and the media have raised 
concerns about BWCs in private homes42 and other private spaces, 
such as locker rooms.43 
Another problem is whether and how to obtain consent to 
record, an issue closely related to the rules governing when BWCs are 
turned on and off. Obtaining consent before recording data is a 
longstanding and important privacy principle, embodied in widely 
accepted best practices like the Fair Information Practices.44 If BWCs 
are always recording or recording by default, individuals may be 
unable to express their preferences about being on video before they 
are recorded. PERF notes that always-on recording may interfere 
with “routine and casual situations” that constitute community 
policing, or infringe on the privacy rights of victims or witnesses.45 
Consent can also be an issue for bystanders, who may not know they 
have been recorded by a BWC at all or may learn about the recording 
after the fact, when a video is made public. 
Scholars and advocates have varied in how they trade off this 
privacy principle, the gathering of consent by those whose data is 
collected, with the goal of transparency. There are important reasons 
to release camera footage to the public to support police transparency 
and accountability, including to document possible police 
misconduct.46 Some states have emphasized the importance of privacy 
by limiting the public disclosure of police BWC footage, citing privacy 
 
 41. LINDSAY MILLER & JESSICA TOLIVER, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 11 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org
/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20camera
%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW8H-WKTD].  
 42. Matthew Feeney, Police Body Cameras Raise Privacy Issues for Cops and the 
Public, CATO INST. (Feb. 12, 2015, 1:27 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/police-body-
cameras-raise-privacy-issues-cops-public [https://perma.cc/9CJF-UY5J]. 
 43. Cops’ Body Cameras Raise Privacy Concerns, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 15, 2014, 
6:24 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/cops-body-cameras-raise-privacy-
concerns-article-1.1722969 [https://perma.cc/9TJM-F6VA (dark archive)]. 
 44. See ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES 3 (2017), 
https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8Y7-8JYM]; see also 
OECD Privacy Principles, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://oecdprivacy.org/ [https://perma.cc/C4R8-P387]. 
 45. MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 41, at 12. 
 46. See Fan, supra note 10, at 410; Kelly Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: 
Privacy Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 91, 95 (2015). 
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concerns.47 Some scholars and advocates have disagreed with this 
approach, emphasizing the need for transparency.48 According to one 
survey, police policies governing BWC use generally agree that 
certain locations are linked to an expectation of privacy where 
cameras should not record, particularly bathrooms.49 Professor Mary 
Fan writes that “[t]he widespread consensus on restrooms is not 
surprising given that concerns about recording officers in bathrooms 
were often raised by police unions.”50 
The position of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) 
illustrates the topic’s difficulty. The ACLU’s stance has evolved over 
time for addressing the twin goals of privacy and transparency. The 
ACLU originally called for recording of all encounters with the public 
to maximize the accountability for officers.51 It has since modified its 
position, however, to account for privacy. The ACLU now accepts 
cameras being turned off in some instances, while supporting cameras 
being turned on by default and remaining active for the duration of 
“any other law enforcement or investigative encounter” with the 
public.52 This Article does not seek to provide a general resolution to 
the question of how to achieve the goals of both privacy and 
transparency. The debate is noted here and Part III emphasizes that 
consideration of transparency that we believe deserves greater 
attention within the general IoT literature. 
A third important consideration for BWCs is the cybersecurity of 
the data they generate. Cybersecurity, defined as “measures taken to 
protect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against 
unauthorized access or attack,”53 is a growing concern as police 
departments grapple with increasing amounts of digital evidence. The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police warns that “[t]here is an 
ever-growing risk of law enforcement organizations being the target 
 
 47. THE MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC, POLICE BODY CAM FOOTAGE 
16–17 (2015), http://isp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/publications/police_body_camera
_footage-_just_another_public_record.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9SK-GNF7]. 
 48. See Fan, supra note 10, at 410. 
 49. Id. at 429.  
 50. Id. 
 51. STANLEY, supra note 7, at 2. 
 52. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A MODEL ACT FOR REGULATING THE USE OF 
WEARABLE BODY CAMERAS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT §	1(b) (2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearable-body-cameras-law-enforcement
?redirect=files/field_document/aclu_police_body_cameras_model_legislation_may_2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UHT4-WN6U].  
 53. Cybersecurity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/G4UX-WELV]. 
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of a cyber-attack.”54 Risks include exposure of confidential 
information, denial of service attacks, ransomware, and tampering 
with evidence.55 Experts warn that the databases that house digital 
evidence such as BWC footage are vulnerable to attack.56 When 
evidence is digitized and stored as data, it becomes vulnerable to the 
same types of attacks that plague other types of digital data. These 
vulnerabilities not only create privacy risks for the subjects of BWC 
footage and others but could impact the chain of custody and 
evidentiary value of data in the event of a hack,57 which could imperil 
prosecutions. Police departments thus face the challenge, shared by 
other organizations that hold personal data, of how to use their 
available resources to respond as well as possible to the wide range of 
possible cyberattacks. To assist police departments in responding to 
these risks, Part II examines IoT best practices for cybersecurity and 
privacy. 
C. The IoT Literature’s Analysis of Similar Privacy and 
Cybersecurity Concerns 
This Section summarizes key points from the extensive literature 
on how to address privacy and security concerns for the IoT. This 
literature has already addressed the three topics just discussed for 
BWCs: the challenge of ubiquitous sensors to privacy in public and 
private spaces, difficulties with consent, and security of digital 
evidence gathering tools. By demonstrating that the issues are similar, 
this Article indicates how some of the responses provided in that 
literature can apply to BWCs as well. 
As with BWCs, scholars have studied how ubiquitous recording 
by IoT devices creates privacy issues both in public and in private. 
IoT devices accumulate types of data not previously collected and do 
so in ever greater volumes, thus revealing in unprecedented ways how 
people move through public spaces.58 The extensive literature on 
 
 54. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, MANAGING CYBERSECURITY RISK 2 (2017), 
http://www.iacpcybercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Managing_Cybersecurity_Risk
_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET45-ZTAY]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Steven Melendez, Police Departments Are Vulnerable to Cyberthreats As Evidence 
Goes Digital, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3055955
/police-departments-are-vulnerable-to-cyber-threats-as-evidence-goes-digital [https://perma.cc
/J6GX-L679]. 
 57. MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 41, at 44. 
 58. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of 
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 816 n.71 (2016). 
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“smart city” technology directly applies to BWC issues. “Smart city” 
technologies include audio gunshot recorders and streetlights with on-
board, internet-connected cameras, and this information gathering 
raises many of the same issues as BWCs.59 As IoT devices enter the 
home, consumers lose privacy in those previously private spaces.60 For 
instance, the FTC recently published a consent decree with a fine of 
$3.2 million against a smart TV manufacturer for deceiving 
consumers about its practice of tracking personal information via the 
TV set.61 Risks come not only from consumer devices like smart 
thermometers and speakers but also from technology that is less 
visible to the consumer, such as smart utility meters.62 The IoT-
generated data streaming from intimate spaces combined with Big 
Data can reveal surprisingly sensitive and personal information.63 
When police wear a BWC into a house, the camera and microphone 
of the BWC become examples of IoT devices within the home. 
The IoT literature has extensively analyzed how IoT may 
challenge the notice and consent model (requiring the entity 
collecting data to first provide notice and obtain consent) that for 
years has been a pillar of privacy law.64 Scholars have noted that 
because many IoT devices—like connected pacemakers or traffic 
lights—lack a screen or other user interface, providing meaningful 
notice and consent can be a challenge.65 In addition, when IoT devices 
are deployed in public spaces, individuals lack a meaningful choice to 
opt-out or withdraw consent from tracking because doing so would 
require withdrawing from the public sphere.66 This lack of a clear 
consent mechanism is similar to the issues discussed above, where 
 
 59. See, e.g., Jesse W. Woo, Smart Cities Pose Privacy Risks and Other Problems, But 
That Doesn’t Mean We Shouldn’t Build Them, 85 UMKC L. REV. 953, 955 (2017).  
 60. Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 
51 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 641 (2015). 
 61. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 8–9, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2017), 2017 WL 7000553, 
at *4. 
 62. See Getting a Grip on the Grid, HORTONWORKS, https://hortonworks.com
/solutions/energy/ [https://perma.cc/4RVY-M77W]. 
 63. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 25, at 5. 
 64. See GELLMAN, supra note 44, at 21–22 (noting that “notice and choice” does not 
meet fair information practices such as data quality, enforcement, and access). 
 65. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 140–141 (2014); Jones, 
supra note 60, at 640. 
 66. See Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy 
in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1582, 1596 (2014); Woo, supra 
note 59, at 965.  
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bystanders or other individuals who are recorded by BWCs often lack 
an opportunity to consent. 
Just as experts are beginning to worry about the cybersecurity of 
BWCs and other digital evidence, experts have already developed a 
large and growing literature on IoT cybersecurity.67 In a prominent 
example, hundreds of thousands of IoT devices were hacked and used 
to launch a distributed denial of service (“DDoS”) attack that harmed 
significant parts of the internet infrastructure.68 There have already 
been numerous accounts of IoT home cameras or children’s toys left 
vulnerable to attack or spying.69 Part of the reason IoT devices are so 
insecure is that they are produced by manufacturers who lack 
experience or expertise in computer security.70 There are also 
technical challenges to strong IoT cybersecurity; for instance, devices 
may lack the computational power to perform complex encryption or 
other security measures.71 While this security environment appears 
bleak, there is a growing body of expert literature on security best 
practices that, if implemented properly, promises to substantially 
reduce this risk.72 Because IoT security issues have arisen already for 
a wide range of industries,73 other IoT sectors have developed 
 
 67. See generally Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: 
Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J. L. & 
TECH. 1 (2015) (discussing cybersecurity issues presented by IoT technology as it relates to 
“wearable” items). 
 68. Michael Kan, An IoT Botnet is Partly Behind Friday’s Massive DDOS Attack, PC 
WORLD (Oct. 21, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/3134056/hacking/an-iot-
botnet-is-partly-behind-fridays-massive-ddos-attack.html [https://perma.cc/98FZ-6SNW].  
 69. See, e.g., Consumer Notice: Internet-Connected Toys Could Present Privacy and 
Contact Concerns for Children, FBI (July 17, 2017) https://www.ic3.gov/media/2017
/170717.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NSE-5BWV]; Samuel Gibbs, Hackers Can Hijack Wi-Fi 
Barbie to Spy on Your Children, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2015, 6:16 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/26/hackers-can-hijack-wi-fi-hello-barbie-
to-spy-on-your-children [https://perma.cc/ZXT7-Y5UB]; Elisabeth Leamy, The Danger of 
Giving Your Child ‘Smart Toys’, WASH. POST (Sep. 29, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/on-parenting/giving-your-child-internet-connected
-smart-toys-could-be-dumb/2017/09/29/a168218a-a241-11e7-8cfe-d5b912fabc99_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/PV87-MD9A]. 
 70. Peppet, supra note 65, at 135. 
 71. See Chris James, Cybersecurity Law and the Internet of Things, SOC’Y FOR 
COMPUTERS & L. (June 6, 2016, 4:58 PM), https://www.scl.org/articles/3670-cybersecurity-
law-and-the-internet-of-things [http://perma.cc/R89G-GKJB]. 
 72. See generally BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3 
(analyzing cybersecurity concerns and security practices to alleviate those concerns). 
 73. From Connected Cars, Healthcare to Uranium Enrichment Facilities, 5 IoT Security 
Hacking Instances to Take Note of!, EMBITEL: EMBEDDED BLOG (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.embitel.com/blog/embedded-blog/security-challenges-faced-by-iot-based-industries 
[https://perma.cc/5PAD-U8B7]. 
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experience about categories of attacks and best practices for 
mitigating the risks. 
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated how police BWCs 
technologically match the definition of IoT devices—sensors 
connected to the storage in the cloud.74 The two literatures—about 
IOT and police BWCs—have identified similar privacy and 
cybersecurity issues.75 To date, however, the IoT literature has largely 
ignored the connection with BWCs, and vice versa.76 Neither body of 
literature has explored how the lessons from each side—IoT and 
BWC—inform policy and best practices for the other. Part II of this 
Article will present lessons from IoT for BWCs. Part III presents 
lessons from BWCs for IoT. 
II.  IOT BEST PRACTICES APPLIED TO POLICE BWCS 
This Part explains IoT privacy and security best practices from 
expert organizations in the field. BITAG,77 the Microsoft 
Corporation,78 and the FTC,79 each a major stakeholder with an 
established expertise in IoT privacy and security, have offered privacy 
and security best practices.80 This Section briefly analyzes the 
recommendations from each source and explains whether and how 
they apply to police BWCs. Each set of this Article’s best practices is 
listed in their entirety to give readers a sense of the universe of 
recommendations in the IoT literature. This Article’s hope is to 
identify applicable best practices for police departments and policy 
makers to make informed decisions, not to create the definitive guide 
for BWC privacy and security. 
 
 74. See supra Section I.A. 
 75. See supra Section I.B. 
 76. Adam Thierer identified BWCs as a type of IoT wearable device that raised 
heightened privacy concerns because of the Fourth Amendment. He did not, however, 
extensively discuss the implications of the two literatures for each other. Thierer, supra 
note 67, at 28–29, 115–17. 
 77. See generally BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3 
(suggesting practices for avoiding cybersecurity risks with IoT devices and software). 
 78. See generally Bets & Diogenes, supra note 4 (discussing security strategies for IoT 
infrastructures). 
 79. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5 (providing recommendations to 
protect consumers from security risks related to IoT). 
 80. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW 
AND POLICY 230–31 (2016).  
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A. BITAG: Internet of Things Security and Privacy 
Recommendations 
BITAG is a group that brings “together engineers and other 
similar technical experts to develop consensus on broadband network 
management practices or other related technical issues.”81 It is 
composed of experts from both academia and industry.82 Its report on 
IoT security and privacy is a leading expert resource, especially for 
security best practices.83 
1.  “IoT Devices Should Use Best Current Software Practices”84 
a. “IoT Devices Should Ship With Reasonably Current 
Software”85 
“BITAG recommends that IoT devices should ship to customers 
or retail outlets with reasonably current software that does not 
contain severe, known vulnerabilities.”86 Because IoT devices are 
physical objects embedded with computers, they operate using 
computer software.87 BITAG recommends that this software be 
reasonably current because software is constantly being updated and 
improved.88 Running older versions of software creates a security risk, 
and shipping IoT devices with outdated software places these devices 
in the market with already lagging security.89 
Like other IoT devices, BWCs run on software to record video 
and typically to transmit those recordings to the cloud.90 BWCs with 
outdated software or known vulnerabilities leave the devices 
susceptible to hacking.91 Such vulnerabilities could compromise the 
 
 81. See BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3. 
 82. Technical Participants, BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GROUP, 
http://bitag.org/tech_work_group.php?action=participants [https://perma.cc/3NSG-RMPN]. 
 83. See Josephine Wolff, Coalition Seeks to Protect Internet From Weaknesses of Many 
‘Connected’ Devices, PRINCETON U. (Nov. 22, 2016, 1:07 PM), https://www.princeton.edu
/news/2016/11/22/coalition-seeks-protect-internet-weaknesses-many-connected-devices 
[https://perma.cc/HD3S-NE7D]. 
 84. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 18. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 88. Deb Shinder, The Risk of Running Obsolete Software (Part 1), TECHGENIX (Feb. 
24, 2016), http://techgenix.com/risk-running-obsolete-software-part1/ [https://perma.cc
/2WDJ-UVRG]. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See supra Section I.A. 
 91. See Shinder, supra note 88. 
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BWCs themselves or, possibly worse, expose a police department’s 
entire network.92 Hacking and exposure of BWC footage or other 
evidence could also violate the privacy of victims, suspects, witnesses, 
or officers.93 BWCs may be in service for long periods of time 
depending on the financial resources of the police department,94 so 
purchasing cameras with the most current software will help ensure 
security over the life of the device. 
b. “IoT Devices Should Have a Mechanism for Automated, 
Secure Software Updates”95 
According to BITAG, IoT manufacturers should “design systems 
and processes to ensure the automatic update of IoT device software, 
without requiring or expecting any type of user action or even user 
opt-in.”96 No software is perfect, bugs that impact security or privacy 
are widespread, and attackers constantly develop new attacks.97 This 
reality will continue to hold true for IoT devices that run software and 
are connected to the internet.98 IoT patchability is important enough 
that the Department of Commerce through the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration has engaged in 
a multi-stakeholder process to ensure IoT security upgradability and 
patching.99 
BWCs run on software to digitally record and transmit video,100 
and that software will need to be patched to maintain security. This 
recommendation clearly applies to BWCs. 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 54, at 2. 
 94. See, e.g., ANNE FRANCES JOHNSON & LYNETTE I. MILLET, NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., SOFTWARE UPDATE AS A MECHANISM FOR RESILIENCE AND 
SECURITY: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP 61–62 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/catalog
/24833/software-update-as-a-mechanism-for-resilience-and-security-proceedings 
[http://perma.cc/2VAB-QY5K (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 95. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 18. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id.  
 98. See supra Section I.A. 
 99. Multistakeholder Process; Internet of Things (IoT) Security Upgradability and 
Patching, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2016/multistakeholder-process-iot-security 
[https://perma.cc/9HGA-P8JN]; see also JOHNSON & MILLET, supra note 94, at 60–61.  
 100. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Solutions for Law 
Enforcement, AXON, https://www.axon.com/solutions/law-enforcement [http://perma.cc
/2BDZ-L5JP]. 
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c. “IoT Devices Should Use Strong Authentication by 
Default”101 
“BITAG recommends that IoT devices be secured by default 
(e.g. password protected) and not use common or easily guessable 
user names and passwords (e.g., ‘admin,’ ‘password’).”102 
Authentication is necessary to determine when an individual is 
permitted to use or modify an IoT device.103 Weak authentication can 
allow unauthorized users to access sensitive data collected by IoT 
devices.104 
As a result, strong authentication is a best practice with 
traditional computing as well as IoT,105 and the practice should apply 
to BWCs too. It is necessary to protect the potentially sensitive data 
collected by BWCs and provide assurance about the integrity of data 
when used as evidence. Strong passwords should protect access to the 
camera footage stored in the cloud,106 and possibly to the BWC as 
well. 
d. “IoT Device Configurations Should Be Tested and 
Hardened”107 
“BITAG recommends that manufacturers test the security of 
each device with a range of possible configurations, as opposed to 
simply the default configuration.”108 Testing device software for 
vulnerabilities is a vital means of ensuring security.109 Like other IoT 
devices, BWCs and storage of camera footage should undergo 
thorough testing, and the results of those tests should be incorporated 
 
 101. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 19. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Securing the Internet of Things: A Proposed Framework, CISCO, 
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/secure-iot-proposed-framework.html#9a 
[https://perma.cc/KW49-UPXX]. 
 104. See Danny Palmer, Is ‘Admin’ Password Leaving Your IoT Device Vulnerable to 
Cyberattacks?, ZDNET (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:10 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/is-admin-
password-leaving-your-iot-device-vulnerable-to-cyberattacks/ [https://perma.cc/M5DK-SG4E].  
 105. The Importance of User Authentication in Network Security, BROOKHAVEN 
NAT’L LABABORATORY, https://www.bnl.gov/cybersecurity/networkaccess/strong-
auth.php [https://perma.cc/WFL6-LJSU]. 
 106. See CLOUD STANDARDS CUSTOMER COUNCIL, SECURITY FOR CLOUD 
COMPUTING TEN STEPS TO ENSURE SUCCESS 14 (2017), http://www.cloud-
council.org/deliverables/CSCC-Security-for-Cloud-Computing-10-Steps-to-Ensure-Success.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/MZ5D-88B4]. 
 107. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 19. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See CLOUD STANDARDS CUSTOMER COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 22–23. 
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back into the camera and storage system to iteratively improve 
security. Where police departments lack the institutional capacity to 
conduct such testing, they may contract for thorough testing from 
their vendors or third parties.110 
2.  “IoT Devices Should Follow Security & Cryptography Best 
Practices”111 
BITAG recommends that IoT devices use security best practices 
when transmitting and storing data.112 This recommendation includes 
using strong encryption, having unique credentials for every device, 
and disabling unnecessary devices and services.113 The full list covers 
the following: 
(a) Encrypt Configuration (Command & Control) 
Communications by Default 
(b) Secure Communications to and from IoT Controllers 
(c) Encrypt Local Storage of Sensitive Data 
(d) Authenticate Communications, Software Changes, and 
Requests for Data 
(e) Use Unique Credentials for Each Device 
(f) Use Credentials That Can Be Updated 
(g) Close Unnecessary Ports and Disable Unnecessary 
Services 
(h) Use Libraries That Are Actively Maintained and 
Supported114 
These best practices are tailored to IoT devices that collect and 
transmit sensitive data. Given the potentially sensitive nature of BWC 
footage (it may include violent crimes or video of individual 
homes),115 they should apply to police BWCs as well. Camera footage 
and other sensitive information should be encrypted, which basically 
means that footage is electronically locked away.116 Police 
 
 110. See, e.g., Security of the Axon Network, AXON, https://www.axon.com/trust
/security [https://perma.cc/3DZ5-GXNS]. 
 111. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 19.  
 112. Id. at 20. 
 113. Id. at 20–21.  
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 116. David Nield, Why You Should Be Encrypting Your Devices and How to Easily Do 
It, GIZMODO: FIELD GUIDE (Sept. 4, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://fieldguide.gizmodo.com/why-
you-should-be-encrypting-your-devices-and-how-to-ea-1798698901 [http://perma.cc/YXH4
-BDJS]. 
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departments should consult with security experts and demand best 
practices from their vendors. 
3.  “IoT Devices Should Be Restrictive Rather Than Permissive in 
Communicating”117 
“BITAG recommends [w]hen possible, devices should not be 
reachable via inbound connections by default.”118 This 
recommendation is designed to limit the number of potential 
vulnerabilities or means of attack (what the security community calls 
the “attack surface”).119 Creating additional, unnecessary points of 
entry creates more opportunities for attackers to hack into devices.120 
Similarly, BWCs should only communicate with other devices 
when necessary. For example, BWCs will need to connect to the 
cloud directly or via the officer’s squad car.121 They may not need to 
connect to public Wi-Fi networks or Bluetooth devices that could 
open the devices up to attack, so such connections should exist only if 
clearly justified in a particular setting.122 
4.  “IoT Devices Should Continue to Function if Internet 
Connectivity is Disrupted”123 
“BITAG recommends that an IoT device should be able to 
perform its primary function or functions (for example, a light switch 
or a thermostat should continue to function with manual controls), 
even if it is not connected to the Internet.”124 BITAG is concerned 
that connectivity outages will unnecessarily render devices useless.125 
Devices may lose connectivity for a variety of reasons such as 
“accidental misconfiguration or intentional attack (e.g. denial of 
service attack).”126 Internet connectivity may add functions to light 
switches or thermostats, but the loss of connectivity should not 
 
 117. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 21. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.; Lily Hay Newman, Hacker Lexicon: What is an Attack Surface?, WIRED (Mar. 
12, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/hacker-lexicon-attack-surface/ 
[http://perma.cc/57DX-NVVS]. 
 120. Newman, supra note 119. 
 121. See Axon Body 2, AXON, https://www.axon.com/products/body-2 [https://perma.cc/
P7MY-M4ST]; supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Axon Body 2, supra note 121. 
 123. BROADBAND INTERNET TECH. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 3, at 21. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. 
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disable these devices entirely; they should just revert to being normal 
light switches or thermostats.127 
This recommendation applies to BWCs, which should continue 
to function even when internet connectivity is lost. Police officers 
enter a wide variety of locations in the course of their work, including 
underground rooms and other places that may not receive a wireless 
signal. By continuing to function even in such places, BWCs can 
continue to serve the policy goals of transparency and accountability 
during temporary internet outages.128 Footage may be recorded and 
uploaded at a later time, as with older generation cameras. In short, a 
BWC should still function as a regular camera even without internet 
connectivity. 
5.  “IoT Devices Should Continue to Function if the Cloud Back-End 
Fails”129 
This recommendation is similar to the previous one. It 
recommends that if the cloud back-end (the computer server that 
stores and processes data from the IoT device)130 fails, the device 
should continue to operate, even if its functionality is partially 
reduced as a result.131 As with the previous recommendation, this 
should also apply to BWCs. 
6.  “IoT Devices Should Support Addressing and Naming Best 
Practices”132 
BITAG recommends that IoT devices use the latest protocols—
the “languages” by which devices communicate with one another133—
to ensure that devices are secure and functional for as long as 
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possible.134 Specifically, BITAG refers to the internet protocol version 
6 and the Domain Name System Security Extension.135 
Like other IoT devices, BWCs will communicate with a cloud 
server and possibly other devices.136 They should do so with up-to-
date protocols to ensure security for as long as possible. 
7.  “IoT Devices Should Ship with a Privacy Policy That is Easy to 
Find & Understand”137 
“BITAG recommends that IoT devices ship with a privacy 
policy, but that policy must be easy for a typical user to find and 
understand.”138 Although the privacy of the BWC user (the officer) is 
important, a major public policy concern for this Article is the privacy 
of the subjects of the camera, the general public.139 Having a publicly 
available, plain language privacy policy on a website, physical signs, 
or mailers enables concerned citizens to remain informed and 
engaged with BWC privacy issues.140 
8.  “Disclose Rights to Remotely Decrease IoT Device 
Functionality”141 
“BITAG recommends that if the functionality of an IoT device 
can be remotely decreased by a third party, such as by the 
manufacturer or IoT service provider, this possibility should be made 
clear to the user at the time of purchase.”142 This recommendation is 
aimed at consumer devices, where the concern is that companies will 
remotely decrease device functionality and deprive consumers of the 
service they paid for.143 It may not be relevant to BWC privacy or 
cybersecurity because police officers are not the same kinds of 
consumers of commercial products—for one thing the individual 
officers do not pay for the device.144 However, police departments 
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may wish to inquire of their vendors about the ability of third parties 
to remotely decrease BWC functionality. Some police departments 
have expressed frustration with how third-party vendors handle their 
data analytics functions for investigative and other purposes,145 so 
departments may want to prevent similar frustration in the BWC 
context. 
9.  “The IoT Device Industry Should Consider an Industry 
Cybersecurity Program”146 
BITAG recommends “an industry-backed program under which 
some kind of ‘Secure IoT Device’ logo or notation could be carried 
on IoT retail packaging.”147 As this Article is concerned with BWCs 
sold to police departments and not the general public, the usefulness 
of a mark or certification on retail packaging is not similarly 
applicable. It may be useful, however, for police departments to 
participate in an industry-wide set of best practices for BWCs as a 
check against possible business, privacy, and cybersecurity problems 
arising from relations with vendors. Developing an industry-wide set 
of best practices, for police departments to check their vendors’ 
practices against, would still be useful. Hopefully, such an 
organization would help raise the bar for privacy and security across 
the BWC manufacturing industry. Organizations including PERF or 
the U.S. DOJ might encourage or promulgate such best practices and 
distribute them through existing networks. 
10.  “The IoT Supply Chain Should Play Their Part in Addressing IoT 
Security and Privacy Issues”148 
BITAG notes that “[e]nd users of IoT devices depend upon the 
IoT supply chain to protect their security and privacy, and some or all 
parts of that IoT supply chain play a critical role throughout the 
entire lifecycle of the product.”149 The supply chain is important 
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because if it is vulnerable, malware may be introduced on the factory 
floor, or during shipping, or on the retail shelf.150 Similarly, BWC 
manufacturers will play a large role in how their cameras ensure 
security and privacy. This is especially true if the device manufacturer 
also provides data processing and cloud management services to the 
police department.151 Those manufacturers will have a great deal of 
control over both the device as it moves through the supply chain and 
the data once the camera is in the field.152 BITAG recommends the 
following practices for the supply chain: 
(a) “a privacy policy that is clear and understandable;”  
(b) a reset mechanism to clear all configurations and delete 
or reset data; 
(c) “a bug reporting system;” 
(d) a “secure software supply chain;” 
(e) support for devices for their entire lifespan; 
(f) a method for consumers to contact the manufacturer as 
well as for manufacturers to inform consumers of 
vulnerabilities; 
(g) disclosure and remediation of software vulnerabilities; 
and 
(h) “a vulnerability reporting process” that is easy to find 
and use.153 
Having a reset mechanism to easily delete data may not be 
advisable for police BWCs, due to legal reasons to preserve video 
footage for evidentiary or transparency purposes.154 However, the 
other recommendations are apt. BWC manufacturers should maintain 
bug reporting systems and other methods to take feedback from users 
on bugs and security vulnerabilities. They should secure their supply 
chain to ensure that malware is not inserted into devices in the 
manufacturing process. Further, they should support BWCs with 
security patches and updates for the entire life of the camera. 
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In summary, BITAG has created best practices based on expert 
experience with the privacy and cybersecurity threats that exist in 
connection with broadband services.155 These broadband internet 
services exist for BWCs as well—sensors connected to the cloud 
through the high-bandwidth transmissions required for video 
footage.156 The BITAG recommendations thus provide a useful 
checklist for issues that may arise for management of BWCs. 
B. Microsoft: “Internet of Things [S]ecurity [B]est [P]ractices”157 
As a leading technology company that has invested heavily in 
security and privacy over time,158 Microsoft possesses a great deal of 
expertise on emerging technologies like IoT. This Article chooses to 
highlight this set of recommendations because of its focus on physical 
as well as digital security. Physical security is an important aspect of 
cybersecurity, as physical access may enable an attack to gain access 
to systems that would otherwise be difficult to crack.159 
Microsoft classifies its recommendations based on the four IoT 
stakeholders.160 The “hardware manufacturer[s]/integrator[s]” are 
those who build or assemble the physical devices.161 The “solution 
developers” design the device functionality; they build the software.162 
The “solution deployer” installs the devices and connects them to 
each other and/or to the cloud.163 Finally, the “solution operator” 
actually operates the devices in the long term.164 For BWCs, the 
manufacturer and developer will likely be the vendor who supplies 
the cameras.165 The deployer may be a third-party vendor, or that 
function may occur within the department. The operators will be the 
police department, possibly in cooperation with a third-party vendor. 
The issues identified in the Microsoft best practices expand on the 
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BITAG recommendations, such as those concerning the IoT supply 
chain. 
1.  “IoT hardware manufacturer/integrator”166 
a. “Scope hardware to minimum requirements”167 
According to Microsoft, IoT “hardware design should include 
the minimum features required for operation of the hardware, and 
nothing more. An example is to include USB ports only if necessary 
for the operation of the device. These additional features open the 
device for unwanted attack vectors that should be avoided.”168 
Manufacturers should design BWCs to reduce vulnerabilities and 
attack vectors such as unnecessary USB ports.169 The purpose of the 
camera is to capture video footage; creating additional methods to 
access the device creates more ways to introduce malicious software 
or otherwise tamper with the BWC.170 
b. “Make hardware tamper proof”171 
Microsoft recommends that IoT manufacturers “[b]uild in 
mechanisms to detect physical tampering, such as opening of the 
device cover or removing a part of the device. These tamper signals 
may be part of the data stream uploaded to the cloud, which could 
alert operators of these events.”172 
The need for tamper-proof IoT hardware is as great in the BWC 
context as it is with regular IoT devices.173 BWCs implicate not only 
the integrity of personal data but potentially criminal evidence as 
well.174 Manufacturers should design hardware to resist tampering by 
officers and third parties. 
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c. “Build around secure hardware”175 
Similar to BITAG,176 Microsoft recommends using encryption to 
secure data storage and IoT devices themselves.177 This 
recommendation applies to BWCs. 
d. “Make upgrades secure”178 
Not only do IoT devices need regular patching to remain secure, 
but the process for patching itself must not be compromised.179 For 
example, the NotPetya attack that hit Ukraine in 2017 infiltrated 
systems through an unsecured software update.180 Police departments 
should consult security experts and require their vendors to use 
secured update systems. 
2.  “IoT solution developer”181 
a. “Follow secure software development methodology”182 
This recommendation is similar to the BITAG recommendation 
to use software best practices.183 As stated above, it should apply to 
police BWCs. 
b. “Choose open-source software with care”184 
Microsoft recommends that “[w]hen choosing open-source 
software, consider the activity level of the community for each open-
source component.”185 Open-source software, where the source code 
is publicly available, is community-driven by nature, so more active 
communities are more likely to find and update software 
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vulnerabilities.186 This recommendation illustrates how the best 
practices from sources including Microsoft can provide questions that 
police departments can pose to vendors during the BWC 
procurement process. 
c. “Integrate with care”187 
Microsoft suggests that software developers integrate different 
capabilities into their IoT devices carefully.188 Creating additional 
functionality introduces greater complexity, which creates more 
opportunities for a vulnerability.189 The benefits of new features 
should be weighed against the increased attack surface.190 This 
recommendation applies to police BWCs and related software 
vendors. 
3.  “IoT solution deployer”191 
a. “Deploy hardware securely”192 
“IoT deployments may require hardware to be deployed in 
unsecure locations, such as in public spaces or unsupervised locales. 
In such situations, ensure that hardware deployment is tamper-proof 
to the maximum extent. If USB or other ports are available on the 
hardware, ensure that they are covered securely.”193 
Police BWCs will, by their very nature, be deployed in public.194 
It is important that they be deployed securely.195 For example, 
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cameras should not be left unattended in the open where they may be 
tampered with.196 
b. “Keep authentication keys safe”197 
“During deployment, each device requires device IDs and 
associated authentication keys generated by the cloud service. Keep 
these keys physically safe even after the deployment. Any 
compromised key can be used by a malicious device to masquerade as 
an existing device.”198 
Police departments must maintain and keep track of BWCs like 
any other hardware. If the cameras have unique device IDs and 
authentication keys (as recommended), then those keys should be 
physically secured and secluded.199 Most people know intuitively not 
to leave their physical keys out in the open—the same logic applies to 
digital keys.200 As police departments move toward uploading BWC 
footage in real time, it becomes even more important to trust the 
identification and authentication of individual BWCs. 
4.  “IoT solution operator”201 
a. “Keep the system up to date”202 
Although automatic updates are a best practice in IoT, as noted 
above by BITAG,203 if updates do not come automatically the device 
user will need to ensure software is up to date.204 
With BWCs, each device must be patched and updated.205 Police 
departments must develop a system to do so, and decide whether 
responsibility for patching devices falls on the individual officer or a 
centralized information technology (“IT”) or quartermaster service. 
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b. “Protect against malicious activity”206 
Microsoft recommends that, where possible, IoT devices should 
run the latest software, including antivirus software.207 
Whether BWCs are able to run antivirus software will depend on 
design choices by the manufacturer.208 There is currently active 
research on how to secure IoT devices with antivirus measures,209 
which may or may not apply to BWCs. In any case, this 
recommendation illustrates the importance of updated and secure 
software, including for other parts of the IoT infrastructure that 
connect to BWCs such as the cloud servers.210 
c. “Audit frequently”211 
Microsoft says that frequent audits are “key when responding to 
security incidents. Most operating systems provide built-in event 
logging that should be reviewed frequently to make sure no security 
breach has occurred. Audit information can be sent as a separate 
telemetry stream to the cloud service where it can be analyzed.”212 
BWC manufacturers and police departments should explore similar 
capabilities for automatic auditing in their devices.213 
d. “Physically protect the IoT infrastructure”214 
In the IOT context, “[t]he worst security attacks . . . are launched 
using physical access to devices.”215 Therefore, an “important safety 
practice is to protect against malicious use of USB ports and other 
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physical access. One key to uncovering breaches that might have 
occurred is logging of physical access, such as USB port use.”216 
In the BWC context, the IoT infrastructure includes the device, 
the cloud servers, and any intermediate transmitting devices such as 
the officer’s squad car.217 Each aspect of the infrastructure must be 
physically as well as digitally protected.218 All the security in the world 
for the camera itself becomes meaningless if an attacker can simply 
walk into the server room where footage is stored and tamper with 
the footage. 
e. “Protect cloud credentials”219 
According to Microsoft, the passwords used to log in, configure, 
and operate the IoT cloud “are possibly the easiest way to gain access 
and compromise an IoT system.”220 The company recommends users 
“change[] the password frequently, and refrain from using these 
credentials on public machines.”221 Password management is a basic 
part of cybersecurity222 and remains important for BWCs. 
In summary, the Microsoft and BITAG sets of best practices are 
generally consistent, but each contains a number of specific 
recommendations not listed by the other. Taken together, they 
provide a thorough set of recommendations for police departments to 
consider when deploying BWCs. 
C. The Federal Trade Commission 
The FTC is the leading U.S. regulator for consumer privacy 
across sectors.223 It is a leading proponent of privacy best practices 
generally and IoT privacy best practices more specifically.224 This 
Section will discuss the FTC report Internet of Things: Privacy & 
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Cybersecurity in a Connected World225 to identify recommendations 
based on the FTC’s IoT expertise. It will also discuss some of the 
more general FTC Privacy by Design recommendations that could 
apply to IoT and BWCs. Broadly, the FTC recommends “data 
security,” “data minimization,” “notice and choice,” and “privacy by 
design.”226 The FTC has highlighted the role of administrative 
controls, in addition to the technical and physical measures stressed 
by BITAG and Microsoft. 
1.  Data Security 
Like other leading organizations, the FTC stresses the 
importance of cybersecurity to protect the data generated by IoT 
devices.227 The report makes recommendations that are similar to 
BITAG and Microsoft, such as access controls and patching.228 It 
emphasizes “security by design,” where developers build “security 
into their devices at the outset, rather than as an afterthought,”229 and 
“defense-in-depth,” where “security measures are considered at 
several levels” such as using a combination of network passwords and 
encryption.230 All of the FTC’s security recommendations apply to 
BWCs, but the recommendation to “retain service providers that are 
capable of maintaining reasonable security”231 is particularly 
applicable. Local police departments may lack deep cybersecurity 
expertise, but they should demand good security from their vendors. 
IoT’s reliance on the cloud can help in this regard, as cloud servers 
can allow for secure storage at scale by organizations with 
cybersecurity expertise.232 
The full list of FTC IoT cybersecurity recommendations is 
largely similar to the BITAG and Microsoft recommendations above: 
(a) Security by Design233; 
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(b) Ensure personnel practices promote good security234; 
(c) Retain service providers that are capable of maintaining 
reasonable security235; 
(d) Defense-in-depth236; 
(e) Reasonable access controls237; and 
(f) Monitor and patch throughout the product’s life cycle.238 
2.  “Data Minimization”239 
The FTC recommends companies apply a principle of data 
minimization by developing “policies and practices that impose 
reasonable limits on the collection and retention of consumer data.”240 
Data minimization means limiting the collection and retention of data 
to only what is necessary to accomplish a particular task, rather than 
operating under a default that more data is always better.241 Data 
minimization has been an important privacy principle for over thirty 
years and has been promoted by entities like the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the Obama 
White House.242 The FTC says that minimization helps protects 
against two distinct privacy harms: (1) it creates smaller data sets, 
which present a less attractive target for hackers and expose less 
information in the event of a breach; and (2) it reduces the risk that 
data will be used in a way that violates the data subject’s reasonable 
expectations.243 The FTC makes more detailed recommendations on 
how to implement minimization in IoT, which this Article examines 
below. 
 
 234. Id. at 29. 
 235. Id. at 30. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 31. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 33. 
 240. Id.at 34. 
 241. See Bernard Marr, Why Data Minimization Is An Important Concept In The Age 
of Big Data, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2016, 3:24 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/03/16/why-data-minimization-is-an-important-
concept-in-the-age-of-big-data/#11dc6dc11da4 [http://perma.cc/86YH-5FW9]. 
 242. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 34. 
 243. Id.at 34–35 
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a. “Impose reasonable limits on the collection and retention of 
consumer data”244 
The FTC states that “the data minimization principle remains 
relevant and important to the IoT.”245 Its report notes that “if a 
company collects and retains large amounts of data, there is an 
increased risk that the data will be used in a way that departs from 
consumers’ reasonable expectations,” which would harm user 
privacy.246 It cites a hypothetical example of a wearable patch to 
assess a user’s skin condition; the device manufacturer does not need 
to collect precise geolocation data to perform its main function, but it 
may want to do so in the future to enable a new feature.247 The report 
suggests the manufacturer wait to collect location data until it decides 
to launch the new feature and consider using less information (zip 
code instead of precise location).248 
This recommendation applies to BWCs. As discussed below, in 
many cases BWC policies already impose limits on recording, such as 
prohibitions on recording in bathrooms or locker rooms to protect 
officer privacy.249 Setting shorter retention periods on camera footage 
also achieves data minimization, where the specific footage is no 
longer needed for the original law enforcement purposes.250 Other 
minimization opportunities may exist in particular police systems as 
well. 
b. “[T]ake reasonable steps to de-identify the data”251 
The FTC suggests that when companies decide to retain data, 
“they should also consider whether they can do so while maintaining 
data in de-identified form.”252 “De-identified” data is data which has 
been stripped of personally identifiable information or data fields that 
 
 244. Id. at 34.  
 245. Id. at 33. 
 246. Id. at 35. 
 247. Id. at 36–37. 
 248. Id at 36. 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43; see also CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG 
POLICE DEP’T, CMPD DIRECTIVES §	400-006 (2015), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static
/policies/2016-06-08%20Charlotte-Mecklenburg%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [http://perma.cc
/5XDZ-BWZR]. 
 250. See, e.g., CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP’T, supra note 249, at §	400-
006. 
 251. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 38. 
 252. Id. at 37.  
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link to an individual.253 The FTC gives the example of a smartphone 
health-tracking application that collects consumer information like 
geolocation.254 Such an application could “maintain and post 
information in anonymous and aggregate form, which can benefit 
public health authorities and the public, while at the same time 
maintaining consumer privacy.”255 The FTC warns, however, that 
companies must take care that data is not re-identified and may wish 
to take various measures to reduce that risk, such as by employing a 
de-identification expert similar to procedures under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).256 De-
identification also means “keeping up with technological 
developments” that may threaten the privacy de-identified data down 
the line.257 
This recommendation may apply to BWCs in some contexts. 
Video footage held for evidentiary purposes will naturally require 
identifying information to be useful. However, video that 
departments release to the public for other purposes, such as in 
response to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests, may 
warrant de-identification.258 In some cases, departments blur the faces 
of bystanders in videos, which is a form of de-identification.259 In 
those instances, de-identification or redaction may serve the dual 
purpose of transparency and privacy better than either displaying the 
un-blurred faces or simply withholding footage. 
 
 253. Cf. Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health 
Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3FMW-Z856] (providing methods of de-identification to meet the 
requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule). 
 254. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 37. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 38. 
 258. Michael Lickstein, Police Body Cameras and Public Records Requests: Another 
Privacy Frontier, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (Mar. 30, 2016), http://stlr.org/2016/03/30
/police-body-cameras-and-public-records-requests-another-privacy-frontier/ [http://perma.cc
/R77U-6UTX]. 
 259. See Alex Pasternack, Police Body Cameras Will Do More Than Just Record You, 
FAST COMPANY (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3061935/police-body-
cameras-livestreaming-face-recognition-and-ai [http://perma.cc/KD4X-VZ5Z]. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2018) 
1510 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
 
c. Make a public commitment “not to re-identify” data260 
The FTC calls on companies to “publicly commit not to re-
identify . . . data.”261 A public promise by a private company allows 
the FTC to enforce that promise, because if the company does 
otherwise it is an unlawful “deceptive act,” in commerce.262 Police 
departments are outside of the scope of FTC enforcement, which 
applies to commercial actors.263 By contrast, the FTC may be able to 
enforce such promises by third-party commercial vendors of BWCs 
and the associated cloud services. In addition, public promises not to 
re-identify BWC footage may help build public trust in this 
technology. This recommendation may therefore still be applicable in 
the BWC context. 
d. Have enforceable contracts with third parties not to re-
identify264 
The FTC recommends companies “have enforceable contracts in 
place with any third parties with whom they share the data, requiring 
the third parties to commit not to re-identify the data.”265 Because 
digital data is easily copied or transferred, privacy protections must 
extend to third parties that handle that data in order to be 
meaningful. If a company de-identifies their data sets but then hands 
the data to a company that immediately re-identifies individuals, that 
protection was ineffective. This recommendation applies to BWCs to 
the extent police departments de-identify their footage. Many police 
departments rely on third parties such as Axon (formerly Taser) to 
process and store their BWC footage. Thus, police departments can 
 
 260. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 38.  
 261. Id. 
 262. 15 U.S.C. §	45	(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby 
deemed unlawful.”); see Stephanie L. Kroeze, The FTC Won’t Let Me Be: The Need for a 
Private Right of Action Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 227, 234–36 
(2015) (“Any person who violates one the FTC’s trade regulation rules with actual 
knowledge, or knowledge that can be implied based on objective circumstances, is liable 
for civil penalties .	.	. provided the act is unfair or deceptive .	.	.	. [A] deceptive act occurs 
where a representation, omission, or practice misleads the consumer, the consumer 
interprets the characteristic in a reasonable manner, and the misleading characteristic is 
material.”). 
 263. Federal law empowers the FTC to regulate “persons, partnerships, or 
corporations .	.	. from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. §	45(a)(2).  
 264. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 38.  
 265. Id.  
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require such vendors not to re-identify through contract, backed by 
FTC, state attorney general, or other enforcement against the vendor 
for violation.266 
3.  Notice and Choice 
While noting the difficulties of providing notice and choice in 
IoT, the FTC report says “that providing notice and choice remains 
important, as potential privacy and security risks may be heightened 
due to the pervasiveness of data collection inherent in the IoT.”267 
The FTC incorporates a “use-based” model into its approach to 
providing notice and choice to consumers.268 This means that notice is 
not required when a company collects and uses consumer data in a 
way that is “consistent with the context of a transaction or the 
company’s relationship with the consumer.”269 On the other hand, 
data uses that are inconsistent with the consumer’s reasonable 
expectations should require notice and choice.270 
The FTC uses the example of a smart oven to illustrate its 
point.271 The oven might be paired with a smartphone app that allows 
the user to remotely control temperature and baking time. In that 
case, using the consumer’s oven-usage data to improve the device’s 
performance would not require consumer choice because consumers 
would reasonably expect such usage.272 However, sharing that data 
with a data broker or advertiser “would be inconsistent with the 
context of the consumer’s relationship with the manufacturer,” so the 
company should provide notice and choice.273 
This “use-based” approach may or may not be applicable to 
BWCs. It is likely that if video footage is recorded in one context (say 
 
 266. The FTC may bring enforcement actions against companies that break publicly 
made promises as “deceptive practices.” 15 U.S.C. §	45(a). State attorneys general, 
depending on state law, generally have enforcement power under state unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices statutes. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW 
CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND 
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 6 (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf
/udap/report_50_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/S59A-B2KS]. Police departments that enter 
into contracts with vendors such as Axon may also bring a civil suit for breach of contract 
by the vendor.  
 267. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 39.  
 268. Id. at 43.  
 269. Id. at 40. 
 270. See id.  
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
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a routine traffic stop), and later becomes relevant to another context 
(say a murder investigation), the police should not need to seek the 
video subject’s (i.e., the suspect’s) consent to use the video. The 
interest in solving and prosecuting a crime are too great in such a 
case. If the context shifts to something other than evidentiary use in a 
criminal prosecution, however, it may make more sense to seek 
renewed consent. Police departments may wish to provide notice or 
seek consent before releasing videos to the public, for instance, 
although doing so surfaces the tension between privacy and 
transparency. 
The FTC recommends other specific methods of providing notice 
and choice in IoT devices. Many of these recommendations likely do 
not apply to BWCs, because the FTC assumes that the device’s user 
will have some access to an interface to modify privacy settings, even 
if that interface is not on the device itself.274 BWCs operate in a 
different context however. While the privacy of the BWC user (the 
police officer) is important, the subjects of the video footage (the 
public) will not have access to such an interface. Therefore, some of 
the recommendations like QR codes on devices, consumer choice 
during set up, management portals or dashboards, or general privacy 
menus do not apply and have been omitted from the discussion.275 
Nevertheless, some of the other best practices may still apply or be 
informative for addressing privacy and cybersecurity concerns, so 
they are included below. 
a. Choices at point of sale 
The FTC advocates, with regard to individual consumers, “opt-in 
choices at the time of purchase in ‘[p]lain language and multiple 
choices of levels.’”276 The concept of a “point of sale,” when police 
departments purchase cameras from their vendors, is not necessarily 
relevant to BWCs. But if the “point of sale” is the point at which 
officers interact with citizens, then this recommendation could make 
sense. Some police department policies instruct officers to obtain 
consent to record when they interact with the public.277 
 
 274. See id. at 40–41.  
 275. Id. at 41–42.  
 276. Id. at 41. 
 277. Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard, UPTURN (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/UX8J-BWTD]. 
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b. Tutorials 
The FTC suggests that IoT manufacturers offer tutorial videos to 
consumers on how to control privacy settings on their devices.278 This 
recommendation could be useful to inform police officers about their 
privacy vis-à-vis BWCs. Police departments may also provide tutorials 
to the public about privacy and cybersecurity aspects of BWC and 
camera footage. 
c. Icons 
The FTC says that “[d]evices can use icons to quickly convey 
important settings and attributes, such as when a device is connected 
to the Internet.”279 This suggestion can apply to BWCs and is 
currently being employed in cameras with a visible light to indicate 
recording.280 Some cameras even deploy a front-facing screen that 
shows members of the public how they are being recorded.281 
d. “Out of band” communications 
The FTC suggests “[w]hen display or user attention is limited, it 
is possible to communicate important privacy and security settings to 
the user via other channels,” such as text or email.282 Similar 
techniques may apply to BWCs, although they would need to adapt to 
the unique circumstances of policing. For instance, it could be 
plausible to imagine a smart phone app or other portable device that 
automatically tagged an individual when they appear in BWC footage 
and notify that person so they can review the footage after the fact. 
Assuming such a system does not compromise the integrity of footage 
or safety of officers, technology could be a means to give individuals 
notice and choice.283 
 
 278. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 41. 
 279. Id. at 42. 
 280. See, e.g., Public Awareness Light on Police Body Cameras, WOLFCOM 
ENTERPRISES, http://www.policebodycameras.com/police-bodyworn-camera-articles
/police_public_awarness_indicator.htm [https://perma.cc/SXG7-NPX9]. 
 281. D-Series, REVEAL MEDIA, https://www.revealmedia.com/products/d-series 
[https://perma.cc/TY4G-RWWU]. The manufacturer promotes this feature by saying it 
“has a proven calming effect on people being recorded and maximises transparency with 
the public.” Id. 
 282. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 42. 
 283. This approach would raise its own privacy issues, however, due to the automated 
identification of persons included in the video. 
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e. A user experience approach 
The FTC suggests that “companies could consider an approach 
that applies learning from consumer behavior on IoT devices, in order 
to personalize choices.”284 Many members of the public will not 
interact with police officers often enough to form a personalized 
choice, so this suggestion would not seem directly relevant. On the 
other hand, further research may be useful concerning citizen 
preferences on privacy with relation to BWCs, such as whether they 
wish bystanders’ faces to be blurred or whether and when officers 
should turn off the camera. 
4.  Administrative Privacy Controls 
Another major report by the FTC, Protecting Consumer Privacy 
in an Era of Rapid Change, lays out the FTC’s recommendations for 
Privacy by Design and administrative privacy controls.285 Although 
the report does not focus on IoT specifically, Privacy by Design is an 
important concept for IoT because it seeks to build privacy into both 
the device itself and the organizational processes that handle camera 
footage and other personal data. This Article therefore includes a 
brief discussion of the FTC’s Privacy by Design recommendations 
below to complement its IoT-specific work. 
a. “Data Security: Companies Must Provide Reasonable 
Security for Consumer Data”286 
The FTC report states “[i]t is well settled that companies must 
provide reasonable security” as an aspect of Privacy by Design.287 The 
Microsoft and BITAG reports discussed above explain security best 
practices for IoT and their application to police BWCs. 
 
 284. Id. 
 285. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS 22–23 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3U5-WDWR]. 
 286. Id. at 24. 
 287. Id. 
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b. “Reasonable Collection Limitation: Companies Should Limit 
Their Collection of Data”288 
The FTC recommends that companies “limit data collection to 
that which is consistent with the context of a particular transaction or 
the consumer’s relationship with the business, or as required or 
specifically authorized by law.”289 This recommendation articulates a 
“data minimization” similar to the one discussed above. 
This recommendation applies to police BWCs. Recall PERF’s 
warning that always-on recording may interfere with community 
policing interactions or witness interviews.290 Policies dictating that 
officers turn off their cameras in certain situations are a form of data 
minimization. 
c. “Sound Data Retention: Companies Should Implement 
Reasonable Data Retention and Disposal Policies”291 
The FTC recommends that companies “implement reasonable 
restrictions on the retention of data and should dispose of it once the 
data has outlived the legitimate purpose for which it was collected.”292 
The FTC notes, however, that retention periods may be flexible and 
allowed to adapt to the needs of the organization and type of data.293 
This recommendation clearly applies to BWCs as well. The 
ACLU recommends that retention of BWC footage “be measured in 
weeks not years, and video should be deleted after that period unless 
a recording has been flagged.”294 Retaining footage for shorter 
periods of time is seen as a data minimization technique that reduces 
privacy risk.295 That BWCs are a type of IoT device lends further 
support for adopting reasonable data retention policies from the IoT 
literature. 
 
 288. Id. at 26. 
 289. Id. at 27. 
 290. MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 41, at 12. 
 291. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 285, at 27. 
 292. Id. at 28. 
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d. “Accuracy: Companies should maintain reasonable accuracy 
of consumers’ data”296 
The FTC recommends “reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy 
of the data they collect and maintain, particularly if such data could 
cause significant harm or be used to deny consumers services.”297 The 
Commission also emphasizes here that measures to ensure accuracy 
should be flexible and “scaled to the intended use and sensitivity of 
the information.”298 
BWC footage is potentially very sensitive and therefore may 
warrant strict measures to ensure accuracy. This is especially true if 
the footage has the potential to be released to the public or used in a 
criminal prosecution. Maintaining the accuracy and integrity of this 
data may require tagging and auditing as well as strict cybersecurity 
measures like those discussed above.  
e. “Companies should maintain comprehensive data 
management procedures throughout the life cycle of their products 
and services”299 
For data management, the Commission recommends the 
following measures: 
(a) “designation of personnel responsible for the privacy 
program;” 
(b) “a risk assessment that, at a minimum, addresses 
employee training and management and product design 
and development;” 
(c) “implementation of controls designed to address the 
risks identified;” 
(d) “appropriate oversight of service providers;” and 
(e) “evaluation and adjustment of the privacy program in 
light of regular testing and monitoring.”300 
Each of these measures apples to police BWCs. It is likely that 
police departments already have administrative procedures to 
safeguard gathered information on the public, for example training on 
how to handle evidence. Given the large volume of sensitive data the 
BWCs may generate, police departments may need to expand these 
procedures and formulate new ones. They should consider programs 
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that focus specifically on privacy, incorporating the measures listed 
above. Oversight of service providers is particularly important if 
departments use outside parties to handle the BWC footage. 
D. Operationalizing Best Practices from the Expert IoT Literature 
We hope the discussion here can speed up the transfer of insight 
from IoT privacy and security experts to police departments 
implementing BWC programs. Each police department is different, 
and policies must respond to local conditions. Further, we have not 
done field research on the institutional practices of the police. 
Nevertheless, we offer three points about how departments can 
operationalize these recommendations, then discuss the relevance of 
“smart city” developments, and conclude with comments on the 
importance of having technical, physical, and administrative 
safeguards for privacy and cybersecurity. 
We first stress the importance of the contractual terms when 
police departments procure BWCs and related services. As is true in 
the private sector,301 these contracts often provide the clearest legal 
source for requiring effective cybersecurity and privacy protection. 
Professor Jan Whittington and co-authors have written that local 
governments have the ability to be “market makers,” not market 
takers” who must unquestionably accept contractual terms from their 
vendors.302 Notably, state and local governments can provide by law 
that BWC procurements be done consistently with strong 
cybersecurity and privacy requirements. Bargaining power will vary 
based on the size of the department and other factors such as local 
procurement regulations, but police departments quite likely are 
better positioned to demand privacy and security best practices than 
the average consumer in the commercial IoT space. 
Second, police departments can draw on their experience 
handling analog evidence to inform how they treat digital evidence. 
While digital evidence presents some unique challenges, some of 
which we explore above, departments should have experience 
 
 301. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFIEC CYBERSECURITY 
ASSESSMENT TOOL 49 (2017), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecurity/FFIEC_CAT_May
_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC7Q-X4GX].  
 302. Jan Whittington et al., Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in 
Municipal Open Government, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1899, 1954 (2015). But see 
Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 112–17 (2017) (documenting the power of surveillance technology 
companies, including BWC manufacturers, to influence policy) . 
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securing physical evidence to preserve the chain of custody and 
procedures to protect the privacy of victims. Departments will need to 
adapt to the digital age, but their old practices and principles will still 
be useful. 
Third, police departments lack the institutional resources or 
experience to implement these best practices and should therefore 
consider seeking outside assistance. Such assistance could come from 
a variety of sources, such as the U.S. DOJ, industry associations such 
as PERF, or outside consultants. The U.S. DOJ and PERF have 
already studied BWC issues in depth and have preexisting channels 
through which to spread that research.303 A key point of this Article is 
that there are challenging issues of privacy and cybersecurity that 
apply to BWCs, which merit systematic attention and adoption of best 
practices. These issues are also a fruitful area of ongoing research.304 
One useful way to see the connection of BWCs to the IoT 
literature is to think of BWCs as a “smart city” application. Smart 
cities are cities “that integrate information and communication 
technologies (“ICTs”) and the Internet of Things (IoT) to manage the 
city’s assets and delivery of services.”305 Because smart cities rely 
heavily on IoT devices,306 smart city research overlaps with IoT 
research. Cities have done extensive work implementing privacy and 
security best practices and policies that can inform the work of police 
departments. The cities of Seattle and San Francisco have public 
documents detailing their privacy and cybersecurity practices.307 
Localities have been enacting local ordinances that govern 
implementation of new surveillance technologies, including in Seattle, 
Oakland, and Santa Clara County (California).308 Whether from 
 
 303. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 37; MILLER & TOLIVER, 
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 304. For one example of research on how police departments handle digital evidence, 
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 305. Woo, supra note 59, at 956. 
 306. Id. at 955.  
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VC4Q]. 
 308. Kevin Schofield, Council Passes Surveillance Technology Ordinance, SCC 
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smart cities or the broader IoT literature, there is a wealth of 
information to help police departments implement BWCs while 
addressing privacy and cybersecurity concerns. 
In mining previous cybersecurity and privacy sources for lessons 
for BWCs, this Article concludes with discussion of the importance of 
a system that addresses the full range of technical, physical, and 
administrative controls. The discussion here has examined three 
sources of recommendations, which significantly emphasized 
technical controls (BITAG), physical safeguards (Microsoft, 
emphasizing hardware risks), and administrative/organizational 
controls (the FTC). This framework of technical, physical, and 
administrative controls is longstanding and useful way to think about 
privacy and cybersecurity. The three categories of controls are set 
forth in a leading law and regulation—the Privacy Act of 1974309 and 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule.310 Police departments and policy makers 
should examine risks and controls for all three of these realms as they 
proceed with their BWC programs. 
III.  LESSONS FOR IOT FROM BWCS 
Part II discussed lessons from IoT for BWCs. This Part considers 
two lessons that BWCs may offer for privacy and cybersecurity in the 
IoT. The first lesson is recognizing that IoT devices are not “always 
on.” Instead, there are important issues to consider about when the 
IoT devices should record or not, depending on time and context. The 
second lesson is the potentially crucial role of transparency and 
accountability for determining when to provide information from an 
IoT device to various audiences. In these two respects, BWCs 
highlight issues that apply more generally to IoT, but where the BWC 
context makes the two issues more salient than in other IoT settings 
studied to date. 
The implicit assumption in many smart cities and other IoT 
deployments is that the sensors are “always on.” For instance, it 
 
3MWV]; Cutting-edge Surveillance Ordinance Approved for Santa Clara County, CTY. 
SANTA CLARA (June 7, 2016), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/d5/newsmedia/press-
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of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security or 
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96 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2018) 
1520 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
 
makes sense for weather sensors to report atmospheric conditions on 
a 24/7 basis, for smart utility meters to measure usage continuously, 
and for sensors that detect urban gunshots to pick up sounds any time 
of the day or night. In the BITAG and Microsoft list of 
recommendations discussed in Part II, the issue of “always on” or 
“when to have the sensor on” does not appear explicitly in any of the 
recommendations. The FTC makes general recommendations about 
data minimization but does not focus on the data minimization 
technique of regularly turning the device off entirely. 
By contrast, a significant issue for BWC governance is when the 
camera should be running. Work by Professor Fan and the digital 
rights group Upturn notes that in many cases the policies governing 
BWC use prohibit recording in bathrooms or locker rooms.311 
Scholars and advocacy groups suggest that officers should turn 
cameras off either at the request of victims or witnesses,312 or in some 
cases should default to an opt-in regime.313 The ACLU originally 
advocated something close to an “always on” model but eventually 
modified its position to recognize clear limits on recording to respect 
privacy.314 This is in recognition that even in a context where 
ubiquitous recording is the norm, certain types of data are so sensitive 
that “always on” collection is inappropriate. Certain locations where 
people have a heightened expectation of privacy, or certain people 
who may be extra sensitive from trauma or other reasons, warrant 
clear limits on recording. 
The need for transparency has also been a much more prominent 
issue for BWCs than for IoT generally. Transparency has been a 
principle reason cited by BWC advocates to adopt the technology.315 
For those supporting transparency, the rationale is that transparency 
will deter bad behavior and engender trust between officers and the 
communities they serve.316 The value of transparency to detect bad 
behavior and foster future deterrence is illustrated by a high-profile 
2017 incident of police officers caught planting drugs at a crime 
 
 311. Fan, supra note 10, at 429; UPTURN, supra note 277. 
 312. See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 41, at 12–13; STANLEY, supra note 7, at 3; 
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 315. See, e.g., id. at 2; UPTURN, supra note 277, at 4. 
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scene.317 Support for transparency has led commentators to worry that 
efforts to block release of BWC footage under state FOIAs will 
undermine transparency.318 Advocates have opposed FOIA 
exemptions for BWC footage, showing the high value placed on 
transparency and accountability in the BWC context.319 
Transparency has not been nearly as prominent a feature in the 
IoT literature more generally. There has indeed been attention to 
transparency in a somewhat different sense, such as where the FTC 
calls for greater transparency in company data practices through 
better privacy notices, consumer access to their data, and better 
consumer education.320 The Online Trust Alliance, an industry group 
promoting best practices in IoT, similarly calls for transparency in the 
form of increased disclosure of data practices.321 This meaning of 
“transparency,” however, applies to transparency about an 
organization’s policies and practices. In contrast, the core meaning of 
transparency in the BWC context has been about what is sometimes 
called “open data”—when and whether to release the actual video 
and accompanying audio to the general public. 
This sort of “open data” issue has come up in the context of 
smart cities and other collection of information by the government. 
The Obama administration, for instance, had open data initiatives 
such as release of data on data.gov.322 Authors including David Brin 
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have also advocated for greater release of video feeds and other data 
in the name of transparency and accountability.323 In practice, 
however, privacy concerns and the risk of re-identification have often 
resulted in data being released publicly than supporters had initially 
hoped. One important feature of BWCs is that full video is being 
released in many instances, despite concerns from the privacy side 
that bystanders, victims, or others are suffering a privacy violation 
due to such release. 
These lessons from BWCs can inform best practices for IoT more 
generally. Best practice guides, such as those created by BITAG and 
Microsoft, quite possibly should consider more explicitly when to 
have an “always on” model, and when instead to minimize or stop 
data collection based on time of day or other criteria. Restrictions on 
BWC recording in bathrooms suggests that the location of recording 
may be an important guidepost. Limits on recording bystanders or 
witnesses implies that certain categories of people require greater 
sensitivity. U.S. law already recognizes heightened privacy interests of 
children and of data in the healthcare and financial fields.324 We 
suggest that the IoT literature could explore application of limits 
based on place, person, or time. The IoT literature could also take 
note of the emphasis on transparency and open data in the BWC 
literature. BWCs are seen as a tool to hold powerful actors (police 
officers) to account. The value of transparency for data feeds from 
BWCs may provide broader lessons for how transparency could 
become a greater priority in other IoT settings. 
CONCLUSION 
A first conclusion of this Article is that BWCs are indeed an 
instance of IoT. The cameras and microphones are sensors, and the 
video and audio feeds characteristically go to storage in the cloud, 
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thus matching the standard IoT definition of sensors with cloud 
storage. 
Understanding this technological equivalence of BWCs and IoT 
assists those seeking to manage the privacy and cybersecurity risks of 
BWCs. Police departments may understandably find that managing 
those risks is an expensive and daunting task. A principle goal of this 
Article has been to provide rich sources of best practices to assist 
those deploying and administering BWCs and the accompanying data 
services. One related outcome is to highlight the role of the 
procurement contract in governing privacy and cybersecurity risks. 
Under state or local law, or negotiation of individual contracts, cities 
and police departments have an opportunity to set requirements for 
how privacy and cybersecurity will be managed by the third-party 
vendors who are so important to the deployment of BWCs and 
related services. 
Another outcome of the Article is to provide insights from the 
BWC experience for IoT more generally. An implicit assumption for 
many IoT deployments is that the sensors are “always on.” For 
BWCs, this is typically not the case, and IoT best practices can do 
more to highlight the opportunity to toggle off sensors, achieving data 
minimization goals. In addition, BWCs are an example of “open 
data” where the full data feed is often available to the public. Those 
who have been debating the benefits of open data efforts, and the 
privacy and other associated risks, can learn from the extensive 
discussions about when transparency and open release of the video is 
appropriate for BWC footage. 
Privacy and cybersecurity risks will continue to evolve for both 
IoT generally and BWCs more specifically. Recognizing the overlap 
of these two usually distinct discourses can offer assistance to those in 
both realms as they face the new risks. 
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